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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case began as a dispute over the construction of a new home. The Defendant, Darin 
Davis, is a general contractor and built a home for the Plaintiffs, Randy and Trudi Poole. The 
parties signed a contract prior to the construction of the home, but near the end of construction 
Davis presented the Pooles with an "extras list" claiming that the Pooles owed him an additional 
$222,865 for the construction of their home. Davis withdrew this additional amount from the 
Pooles' construction loan and the Pooles sued Mr. Davis. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On August 28, 2009, a complaint was filed by the Pooles with the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County, Idaho. The complaint alleged claims for breach of 
contract and breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance. Davis tIled an Answer and 
Counterclaim on November 9,2009, alleging a claim for breach of contract. Davis then moved 
for permission to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim. The Court granted the motion and 
the Amended Answer and Counterclaim alleged claims against the Pooles for breach of contract, 
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. 
After having conducted written discovery and after having taken depositions, the Pooles 
moved for permission to amend their Complaint to include a claim for fraud. On July 1,2010, 
the Court granted the Pooles' motion and an Amended Complaint was filed. The Amended 
Complaint added the claim for fraud "[in] the alternative to the allegations for the first cause of 
action for breach of contract." (R. p. 5.) Davis filed a Second Amended Answer and 
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Counterclaim and denied the fraud. (ld., pp. 60-72.) His counterclaim again alleged three causes 
of action against the Pooles, including breach of contract, quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, 
and promissory estoppel. (ld.) 
A jury trial was held January 3 - 6, 2011, in Bingham County, Idaho. At the conclusion 
of the four-day jury trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Pooles for $65,331. (Id., pp. 
84-86) The jury found that as between the Pooles' claims for breach of contract and fraud that 
Davis had committed fraud. (Id.) The jury denied the Pooles' claim for breach of the warranty 
of workmanlike performance. ([d.) 
Davis failed to put on evidence in support of his claims for breach of contract, quantum 
meruit/unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. As such, these claims were not put on the 
verdict form and the Pooles prevailed on all of Davis' claims. 
Following the verdict the District Court entered ajudgment against Davis for $65,311. 
(Id., pp. 87-88.) The Pooles filed a timely memorandum of attorney fees and costs claiming that 
they were the prevailing party and that they were entitled to fees since the case was a dispute 
involving a commercial transaction. (Id., pp. 89-116.) 
The District Court found that there was no prevailing party and denied the request for an 
award of attorney fees. (Id.,pp.117-18.) 
The Pooles filed a motion to reconsider and the Court again denied the request for fees on 
the basis that there was no prevailing party. (Id., p. 127.) 
The Pooles have appealed the denial of their request for an award of attorney fees. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
In October of2007, Randy and Trudi Poole ("PooIes") signed a written contract with 
Darin Davis, d/b/a Darin Davis Construction (hereafter "Davis"). Davis is a general contractor 
who contracted to build the Pooles' home near Blackfoot, Idaho. The contract called for Davis 
to construct the home for a fixed purchase price of$396,500. 
Following the commencement of construction, there were some change orders made by 
the Pooles. Some changes requested were an additional cost to the construction of the home, and 
some changes resulted in less material or labor and were a credit to the amount owed. 
The Pooles began making payments to Davis in October of 2007 when they signed the 
construction contract. They first gave Davis $40,000 as a down payment on the amount owed 
under the contract. They made additional cash payments in November, 2007 and January and 
February 2008. In total, the Pooles made cash payments to Davis of$225,000. 
At trial the Pooles testified that, in addition to the cash payments, they obtained a 
construction loan for $450,000. The Pooles testiiied that at Davis' request, they signed all of the 
blank draw requests for their construction loan and gave them to Davis early in the project. 
When Davis wanted cash for the project, he only needed to fill-in the blank, signed draw request 
and then submit it to the bank in order to receive payment. The Pooles did not monitor the 
construction loan, believing that Davis would only withdraw the amount under the contract. 
At the end of construction, the Pooles discovered that in addition to the $225,000 in cash 
that they had paid, Davis had withdrawn nearly the entire $450,000 construction loan. The 
Pooles were astonished to learn that Davis had taken over $675,000 for the construction of their 
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home. When pressed for an explanation, Davis presented the Pooles with an "extras" list for 
$222,865 that Davis stated was for the change orders requested by the Pooles. 
The Pooles demanded a refund of money and contested the $222,865 in change orders. 
Davis gave the Pooks a refund of $12,0 12 on the project. 
After further discussions and demands, the Pooles tiled a complaint. As part of 
discovery, the Pooles requested all of Davis' receipts related to the construction of their home. 
The Pooles and their counsel were able to match the receipts with the list of extras that Davis 
wanted to charge the Pooles. It was evident upon matching the receipts with the list of extras 
that Davis fraudulently added signiticant sums to the amounts he claimed were owed. Davis 
would, for example, tack-on $500, $1,000, or $2,000 to an "extra" item. Davis also failed to give 
credits to the Pooles and failed to recognize allowances. 
After presenting this evidence at trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding that 
Davis had committed fraud. The jury calculated that Davis owed an additional $65,311 to the 
Pooles. A judgment was entered for that amount. 
No party has disputed that the nature of the contract between Davis and the Pooles 
constituted a commercial transaction. The Pooles alleged in their Amended Complaint that 
Davis "is a construction professional and works in the area of residential construction." (R. p. 
53.) Davis admitted the allegation in his Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. (Id., p. 
66.) 
The Pooles requested an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party in the action and 
contend that that without an award of fees the Pooles will continue to be the victims of fraud. 
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n. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Pooies are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-
120(3) and as the prevailing party under Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
Tyler v. Keeney, 128 Idaho 524, 915 P.2d 1382 (Ct. App. 1996); see also IDAI/O CODE ANN. § 12-
120(3) (2011). Idaho Appellate Rule 41 justifies the Pooles' request for attorney fees on appeal 
and the Couri may determine the amount awarded pursuant to this Rule. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The district court abused its discretion in determining that the Pooles were not 
the prevailing party. 
The District Court erred in its determination that the Pooles were not the prevailing party. 
The Pooles were the prevailing party as defined by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)( 1 )(B) 
and are, therefore, entitled to an award of fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). The Court failed 
to consider "the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties." Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B). 
1. Standard of Review. 
The determination of prevailing party status is a discretionary decision for courts. 
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538,224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010). "When examining 
whether a district court abused its discretion, [the] Couri considers whether the district court: (1) 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the out boundaries of that discretion and 
consistently within the applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." Id. 
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2. The district court did not perceive the decision as being within its 
discretion. 
There are no written orders in this case explaining the district court's rationale for finding 
that the Pooles were not the overall prevailing party in the litigation. There are two Minute 
Entries that contain orders from the court denying the Pooles' request and motion for 
reconsideration. (R. pp., 117, 127-28.) There is nothing in the two Minute Entry and Orders that 
indicate that the district court perceived the decision as being within its discretion. The two 
orders simply deny the fee requests in conclusive fashion. There is no discussion or explanation 
by the district court about why the Pooles were not the overall prevailing party in the action. 
There is no evidence in the district court's order that it even applied the proper legal standards 
argued in briefing by the parties or that the district court even considered the applicable legal 
standards. There are no reasons for the denial of attorney fees and no justification for the 
decision. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 
536,538,224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010). 
3. The Pooles asserted alternative claims and prevailed on one of the 
alternative claims. 
The district court abused its discretion when it refused to find the Pooles to be the 
prevailing party because the Pooles (a) prevailed on the primary issue in the case and (b) avoided 
all liability on the counterclaims asserted by Davis. The district court failed to apply the 
pertinent legal standards to the attorney fee request by the Pooles. This action by the Court 
constituted an abuse of its discretion. 
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This Court has recognized that when claims are asserted in the alternative, prevailing 
only on one claim does not bar that party from being the overall prevailing party in the action. 
S'hore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P.3d 1114, 1125 (2009). The overall prevailing 
party should be based on the overall results of the lawsuit and not on individual claims or 
skinl1ishes in the litigation. Steel & Cons/r. v. Martel Cons!r .. Inc., 129 Idaho 288, 923 P.2d 
995, 1000 (et. App. 1996); see also Eighteen Mile Ranch. LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). Such a standard is consistent with Rule 
54( d)(l )(B), which states: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial 
court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound 
discretion may detennine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in 
pati, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair 
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action 
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B). Thus, it makes sense that when there are multiple claims, and 
those claims are asserted in the alternative, that district courts should focus on the overall result 
in the action and how the final judgment allocates liability when determining whether a party 
prevailed in the action. This is the essence of the Shore v. Peterson decision. 
In Shore, the plaintiff sued to enforce a promissory note. Shore, 146 Idaho at 907, 204 
P. 3 d at 1118. The defendant asserted a defense of accord and satisfaction and a counterclaim for 
conversion. ld. The district court dismissed the conversion counterclaim at trial, finding that it 
was alternative to the accord and satisfaction defense and unnecessary to the proper adjudication 
of the case. ld. at 915, 204 P.3d at 1126. The district court ultimately found an accord and 
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satisfaction and ruled in favor of the defendant ld. at 907,204 P.3d at 1118. 
When the district court considered the defendant's request for attorney fees, the court, 
notwithstanding its earlier ruling that the conversion claim was an alternative claim, relied on the 
dismissal of the counterclaim to deny the attorney fees request. ld. at 915,204 P.3d at 1126. 
The Shore court ruled that because the district court improperly and inconsistently analyzed the 
issues in the case, it abused its discretion by not finding an overall prevailing party. ld. 
In this case, the Pooles always asserted the fraud and breach of contract in the alternative. 
The Amended Complaint identifies the fraud claim as being in the alternative to the breach of 
contract claim. (R. p. 56.) The special verdict form contains only one line for damages for 
breach of contract or fraud. (ld., pp. 84-85.) Indeed, Question No.3 on the special verdict form 
states: "What is the total amount of damages caused to the plaintiffs by the defendant's breach of 
contract or fraud?" (ld., p. 85.) (emphasis added). 
In Pooles' closing arguments, counsel argued to the jury: "So whether you get there by 
breach of contract or by fraud, what is the total amount of damages?" (Tr. 10.) Pooles always 
argued their claims in the alternative. The Pooles prevailed on their fraud claim against Davis 
and received a favorable judgment. (ld., p. 87.) By obtaining judgment against Davis, the 
Pooles "won" their case and prevailed as plaintiffs. "Viewing [the Pooles'] success from an 
overall standpoint," the Pooles prevailed in the litigation. 
The district court abused its discretion because it failed to properly apply this Court's 
precedents in Shore and Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC. The district court did not act within the 
applicable legal standards and therefore did not reach its conclusion as a result of reason. The 
Appellant Brief - 8 
district court's failure to find the Pooles as the prevailing party should be reversed. 
4. The Pooles prevailed on Davis' counterclaims. 
The Pooles avoided all liability on Davis' counterclaims. Davis asserted various 
eounterclaims against the Pooles, including breach of contraet and equitable remedies. (R. pp. 
60-72.) Davis failed to put on any evidence at trial that would have supported any of his elaims. 
The special verdict form does not ask the jury to decide any of Davis' claims. (ld., pp. 84-85.) 
Davis has not received a judgment in his favor against the Pooles. Davis failed to recover 
against the Pooles and instead had a judgment of $65,311 entered against him arising out of this 
case. (ld., pp. 87-88.) 
In this case, the district court was under the obligation to evaluate the case from an 
overall view and not a elaim-by-elaim perspective. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at 
719, 117 P.3d at 130. The district court could not have evaluated the case from an overall view 
because the Pooles obtained a judgment against Davis and avoided all liability to Davis. I 
"Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 
Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. "[W]hile a plaintiff with a large money judgment may be more 
exalted than a defendant who simply walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not 
ignore the value of a successful defense." ld. Here, the Pooles are the type of defendants that 
Court envisioned when it decided Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC. The Pooles were sued and 
I It would be easy to just count the number of claims asserted by the parties and tally who won on what claims, and 
the party that won the most claims, either by receiving a judgment or avoiding liability, would be the de facto 
prevailing party. However, the Court has not approved such an approach to the prevailing party analysis. The 
Court, at least as far as counsel for the Pooles can tell, has never required a party to win on evelY claim asserted 
either by or against it to be considered the prevailing party. Such a high standard would essentially eviscerate 
attorney fee awards in Idaho because parties rarely prevail on all claims. 
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avoided all liability on the counterclaims and the Pooles obtained judicial relief in the form of a 
judgment against Davis. 
By not acknowledging the final judgment in the case, the district court ignored Rule 
54( d)( 1 )(13) and its guidance. The final judgment and its consequences on the litigation are to be 
considered when analyzing whether a party prevailed in a lawsuit. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B). 
The tinal judgment, in relation to the relief sought by the parties, weighs in the Pooles' favor 
because the jUdgment is in the Pooles' favor. By not giving the final judgment due regard, the 
district court abused its discretion. 
B. The Pooles are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
In order to be awarded attorney fees on appeal, the Court requires the parties to brief and 
argue the issue on appeal. Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho. 799, 805,241 P.3d 972,978 (2010). 
The Pooles submit that they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. 
The mandatory fee provisions ofIdaho Code § 12-120(3) govern on appeal as well as the 
trial level. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at 721, 117 P.3d at 135. Appeals involving the 
entitlement to attorney fees under § 12-120(3) are subject to the provisions of that statute. ld. 
Thus, in order to be awarded attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) the 
Pooles must have (a) prevailed on the appeal and (b) the appeal must have involved a transaction 
subject to Idaho Code § 12-120(3)' s terms, not necessarily a commercial transaction.2 See Reco 
Constr. Co. v. J-U-B Eng'rs. Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 726,184 P.3d 844,851 (2008). If the court 
2 Idaho Code § 12-120(3) identifies various other transactions that are subject to its terms in addition to the catch-all 
"commercial transaction" language. 
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finds that the only applicable portion of Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is the commercial transaction 
portion of the law, then the court engages in a two-pronged inquiry. Iron Eagle Dev., LLC v. 
Quality Design SYs., Inc., 138ldaho 487, 493, 65 P.3d 509, 515 (2003). First, the Court analyzes 
whether the commercial transaction was integral to the claim. Id. Second, the commercial 
transaction must be the basis for recovery. Id. This is because courts are not under the 
obligation to award attorney fees every time a commercial transaction is associated with a 
lawsuit. Ervin Constr. Co., 125 Idaho at 704,874 P.2d at 515. 
Assuming that the Court reverses the district court's decision regarding the Pooles' 
entitlement to attorney tees, the Pooles would be the prevailing party on appeal. The Pooles 
would also be considered the prevailing party in the proceedings below. When a party prevails 
below and on appeal, the paIiy is entitled to attorney fees. See Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 
Idaho at 721, 117P.3dat 135. 
The issues in this case focused on the transaction between the Pooles and Davis for the 
construction of a home. The Court has previously found that the construction of a home can be a 
commercial transaction. See Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Constr., Inc., 144 Idaho 171, 175, 158 
P.3d 947, 951 (2007) (citing Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 874 P.2d 506 
(1993) (involving a dispute over the construction contract for a log home and analyzing Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3»). Davis has not argued that this was not a commercial transaction. 
Here, the commercial transaction was integral to the claim. It was the gravamen of the 
dispute arising between the Pooles and Davis. There can be no doubt that the Pooles' claims are 
based on issues regarding the construction of their home. The construction contract and Davis' 
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performance of the contract constitute the gravamen of this action. The Pooles claimed that 
Davis breached his contract by overcharging, failing to get written approval for change orders, 
failing to give the PooIes credit for work performed, and failing to construct the home as 
required. The Pooles also claimed that Davis committed fraud by falsely representing additional 
construction expenses. All claims relate to the construction of the home, which is the gravamen 
of this lawsuit. 
The basis for the recovery was the commercial transaction between the parties. Though 
the recovery was for the tort of fraud, such a method of recovery is no longer a bar to recovery in 
the commercial transaction setting. See Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 
152 P .3d 594 (2007). Thus, since the Pooles obtained a judgment against Davis for fraud arising 
out of the commercial construction contract, the second prong has been satisfied. 
As a result of the foregoing, the Pooles are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs 
on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The district court erred when it found that there was no prevailing party and denied the 
Pooles of an award of attorney fees. As an issue of law, this Court should reverse the denial of 
an award of attorney fees. The Pooles are also entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED: October 13,2011 
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